Man and the Origin of Sin
Because Calvinists accept a system that makes it impossible to say anything conclusive about the character of God, neither can they say anything definite about the character of man. For if God’s character is the yardstick (so to speak) by which ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are measured, and the markings on the yardstick are too confused to read, then it is impossible to say whether man himself is doing good or evil. Morally then, man remains unfinalized, and it cannot even be stated that he sins. Indeed, even the idea that a man could sin in an act of self-determination is a problem for Calvinists. For the very presence of sin implies a will other than God’s holy will at work. Thus in the following passage Boettner’s view that sin is “illogical and unreasonable” is his attempt to put the discussion of sin, and especially the question as to who is responsible for its origin, into a realm that discourages discussion:
To begin with, we readily admit that the existence of sin in a universe which is under the control of God who is infinite in His wisdom, power, holiness, and justice, is an inscrutable mystery which we in our present state of knowledge cannot fully explain. As yet we only see through a glass darkly. Sin can never be explained on the grounds of logic or reason, for it is essentially illogical and unreasonable.xxv
To avoid a conclusion that would destroy God’s absolute sovereignty, Boettner thus puts his explanation of sin beyond language and reason. We are told that sin is an “inscrutable mystery” which is “illogical” and “unreasonable.” So the impression left by Boettner upon the reader is that man is not responsible for its causation (even as, indeed, man cannot be responsible for any causation). Thus man’s moral character is never really granted a status. This loss in defining the identity of God, man, and sin, is what has produced blurred statements from Boettner such as the following:
The motive which God has in permitting it [sin] and the motive which man has in committing it are radically different. Many persons are deceived in these matters because they fail to consider that God wills righteously those things which men do wickedly.xxvi
The first thing that jumps out at us in the above passage is Boettner’s backpedaling use of the word “permitting,” in reference to God permitting sin. One wonders how divine ‘permitting’ fits in with God irresistibly ruling and overruling all phenomena! Then, of course, Boettner seesaws his language by saying that “God wills righteously those things which men do wickedly.” Boettner here is proposing something different from what Genesis 50:20 means, when it gives us Joseph’s reply to his brothers, i.e., “ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good…” For Joseph was not saying that God created the jealousy in his brothers’ hearts—i.e., “it”—but that God had prompted them to sell him (Joseph) into slavery to the Egyptians. The selling of Joseph into slavery is the “it.” (For note the preceding context of Genesis 50:15, in which the brothers express fear for “all the wrong which we did to him.” People normally speak this way when describing their actions done against, not their ill-feelings toward, someone, though here of course the latter led to the former.) Taken by itself, it was not a wrong act for God to prompt Joseph’s brothers to sell Joseph into slavery. Sin only arose when Joseph’s brothers attached their own additional agenda of hatred to God’s desire that Joseph be a slave. Designating Joseph for slavery was not an immoral act of God, since God had even commanded that Abraham sacrifice his own son. It is a hard saying, but every believer who has received the forgiveness of sins and stands to inherit the kingdom of God owes his very life to God—so, if God wishes that such a man be a slave in this life in order that good may result, it is no wrong to him. After all, God is not asking the man to sin, but only to serve. And such suffering of the man is not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in him in the afterlife. (Easy to say, harder to believe and to live one’s life with such faith accordingly!) The maliciousness, then, of Joseph’s brothers was their own addendum that had nothing to do with God’s desire that Joseph be sold into slavery. Joseph was not really excusing his brothers for their jealousy, because he later states that their intention was that his enslavement would cause him harm. (See p. 414ff about the Assyrian King adding his own addendum to God’s agenda). Because Boettner, however, believes that the very thoughts and intents of people’s souls are created, he must also believe that God created the sinful jealousy within Joseph’s brothers. Perhaps Boettner thinks God’s agenda is dependent upon such jealously, though it seems to me that God’s plan could have been conveyed, for example, through a divinely-given, shared dream. Thus, to excuse God, Boettner’s apologetic becomes one of pure bias. In effect, he states that God is right because he is God, as though this were any real explanation of the origin of sin. And so Boettner’s apologetic is simply reduced to a pro Deo/ad hominem argument—i.e., God is right because He is God, and man is wrong because he is man. In fact, the essence of his Calvinistic argument is nothing more nor less than this.
The tremendous problems that arise from such a Calvinistic view regarding the absolute sovereignty of God, the problem of evil, and the moral indeterminacy of both God and man should be somewhat apparent by now. In order to solve these problems Calvinistic authors have appealed to the Bible, claiming support. The reason I have not focused as much attention on specific Bible verses disproving Calvinism up to this point in the book, is because I believed it would be useful to first point out that no one picks up the Bible without having certain presuppositions about the nature of God and His Word. These presuppositions influence the way we interpret and understand Scripture. These presuppositions, in fact, are why there are different theologies within Evangelicalism, and why Evangelicals are offering the world two very different views of God. Of course, the goal of the Christian should always be to realign his presuppositions with what the Bible really teaches. No one said this process would be easy, but until Evangelicals rightly divide the Word of Truth, their apologetic to the world will remain appallingly weak.6 At the risk of sounding cavalier, if men are going to damn themselves in unbelief, Christians ought to at least make sure that what they disbelieve is the truth. It would be an ironic tragedy if an unsaved man rejected the Bible for what, in fact, proved to be an unbiblical idea.7 Even so, to whatever extent men thus reject God because Evangelicals fail to give a biblically rational answer about why bad things happen in a world that God created, they become responsible for such men’s damnation to that extent.
6 Unless the Word of God is rightly divided, it will affect not only the Christian, but also the Christian’s effective use of his gift when attempting to minister to the Body.
7 In his Autobiography Benjamin Franklin tells of his interest in the Christian religion, until its contradictory premises of divine predestination and human freedom led him to exasperatingly abandon it for more practical applications of knowledge. Thomas Paine, pamphleteer, and a Deist like Franklin, spoke approvingly of Franklin’s abandonment in a scathing indictment of Romans 9:18-21, which Paine directed “to the Ministers of the Calvinist Church.” Interestingly enough, Paine held the same mistaken assumption as his Calvinist contemporaries, i.e., that Paul espoused Reprobation in his use of the metaphor of the Pot and the Potter. In concluding his remarks Paine states:(1)
Doctor Franklin gives a remarkable instance of the truth of this, in an account of his life, written by himself. He was in London at the time of which he speaks. “Some volumes,” says he,
“against Deism, fell into my hands. They were said to be the substance of Sermons preached at Boyle’s Lectures. It happened that they produced on me an effect precisely the reverse of what was intended by the writers; for the arguments of the Deists, which were cited in order to be refuted, appeared to me more forcible than the refutation itself. In a word I soon became a perfect Deist.”
Another famous Deist, Voltaire, similarly rejected the professing Christianity of his era, which he essentially took to be synonymous with both Catholicism and Calvinism. Following the great earthquake in 1755 that destroyed Lisbon, Portugal, Voltaire wrote a friend:
One would have great difficulty in divining how the laws of movement operate such frightful disasters in the best of all possible worlds…. What will the preachers say, especially if the palace of the Inquisition has been left standing? I flatter myself that the reverend father inquisitors will have been crushed like the others. That should teach men not to persecute men.
Thomas S. Vernon, commenting on this letter in his book, Voltaire (1989), describes the French philosopher’s reaction against the religious assumptions of the Optimism of his day:(2)
The italicized phrase is a reference to Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher who, in 1710, had published a work explaining that the evil and suffering we witness are necessary features of a world which otherwise would not be as perfect as it is. This was a popular view among philosophers and theologians of the time: our limited minds cannot grasp reality as it is perceived by an infinite, benevolent, and all-powerful God who, out of an infinite number of possible worlds, has created the best that could be. This is one way of dealing with what is known in the history of thought as the problem of evil: … Theodore Besterman reminds us that “in this context optimism has nothing to do with one’s outlook on life; it is the belief that all that is and happens is for the best.” Indeed to some thinkers, including Voltaire, the Leibnizian view makes for the deepest sort of pessimism, for if we were obliged to believe that the conditions of human life we see about us are the best that is possible—even under the management of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God then we have good reason to be discouraged, not only about this life but about the life to come as well.
Hence Leibniz embraced the same Optimism which today goes under the name ‘the greater good theodicy,’ as described, e.g., by Calvinist James Spiegel in his book, The Benefits of Providence,which we will examine in a later chapter.
(1) [www.infidels.org/library/historical/thomas_paine/
predestination.html].
(2) [http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/voltvern.htm].
xxv Boettner, p. 228.
xxviBoettner, p. 229.